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1  Introduction
This paper deals with comparative sentences in English modified by the focus 
particle even, which I call even-comparatives hereafter. This type of comparatives 
displays peculiar behavior compared to ordinary comparatives, but this has been left 
unexplained in the literature (cf. Bennet 1982, Ippolito 2007). My contention in this 
paper is that the behavior of even-comparatives may be explained by combining two 
independent theories about presupposition and focus semantics. More specifically, I 
claim that we need to introduce a free variable into the focus semantics of 
even-comparatives, instead of a set of alternatives as usually assumed.
 This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I first lay out three properties 
of even-comparatives that differ from ordinary comparatives, and argue that they are 
not explained by the traditional focus semantic analysis of even. Section 3 presents 
another way to look at focus-induced effects on the even-comparatives and introduces 
the free variable analysis of presupposition given by Beck (2007). In section 4, I 
propose my own analysis based on the free degree variable in focus-induced 
presupposition, which unites the results in section 3. The last section concludes the 
paper.
2  Even in comparative sentences
2.1  Properties of even-comparatives
One of the hallmarks of comparative sentences with dimensional gradable adjectives 
(e.g. tall, wide, long) is their lack of norm-related entailment: they do not entail the 
corresponding positive sentence. In the examples below, (1b) does not entail (1a) 
and thus (1b) can be true under the situation where both John and Bill are short (or 
not tall).
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This entailment is called norm-related, because the semantics of a dimensional 
gradable positive adjectives is relative to the notion of a “norm” or the standard 
degree to which an individual satisfies the property denoted by the adjective (cf. 
Bierwish 1989).
 Adding even, a focus particle in English, to a comparative sentence as in (2a) 
may change this pattern. In even-comparatives, unlike the ordinary one in (1b), the 
compared element exhibits the norm-relatednes 1),s: 2)
From (3a), one can infer that (3b). Note that this effect is not shared by other 
(degree) adverbs: (3c) does not entail (1a) or (3b). 
Note at this point that even-comparatives have to be distinguished from those where 
even scopes a comparative adjective itself:
Here, what is contrasted are the properties such as happier, calmer, better tempered, ..., 
and among them, better looking is considered to be the most unexpected one.
 The norm-relatedness associated with even-comparatives is considered to be a 
presupposition: it projects in the contexts of interrogatives, conditionals, and 
negation.
(1) a. John is tall. / Bill is tall.
b. John is taller than Bill.
(2) John is tall.≈John̓ s height reach s and exce ds the degree that is considered to
be the tandard for tallne s, or “norm”, in the context.
(3) a. John is even taller than Bill.
b. Bill is tall.
c. John is much taller than Bill.
(4) Dubai is reaching for the sky once again, with the developer of the worldʼs tallest
building owing to build an ven taller tower bedecked with ro ating balconies
and el vated l ndscaping inspired by he mythical hanging gardens of Ba ylon.
(emphasis mine, Guardia , April 10, 2016)
(5) His psycho-therapy has made him happier than he used to be, as well as calmer,
better tempered, more loving toward his wife, and more efficient at work. He is
better looking, even. (Bennet (1982: 409))
(6) Assumption: Bill is {not all/short}.
a. #Is John even taller than Bill?
b. #If John is even taller than Bill, he (=John) will be a new member of our
basketball team.
c. #It is not the case that John is even taller than Bill.
3)
(7) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him (=Bill)).
b. And none of them is tall.
(8) Bill is taller than Chris, and John is taller than him (=Chris), too.
(1) a. Jo n is tall. / Bill is tall.
b taller than Bill.
(2) John is tall.≈John̓ s h ig t reaches and exceeds the degree that is considered to
be the standard for tallness, or “norm”, in the context.
(3) a. John is even taller than Bill.
b. Bill is tall.
c. John is much taller than Bill.
4 Dubai is reac ing for the sky once again, with the dev loper of the worldʼs tall st
uilding vowing to build a even taller tow r be ecked with rotating balconie
and elevated landscaping i spired by the mythical hanging gardens of Babylon.
(emphasis mine, Guardian, April 10, 2016)
5) His psych -therapy has made him happier than he used to be, as well as calmer,
etter tempered, more loving toward his wife, a d more efficient at work. He is
bet er lo king, ev n. (Bennet (1982: 409))
(6) Assumption: Bill is {not tall/short}.
#Is John even taller than Bill?
#If John is even taller than Bill, he (=John) will be a new member of our
basketball team.
c. #I is not the case that John is even taller t an Bill.
3)
(7) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is ev n taller (than him (=Bill)).
b. And none of them is tall.
(8) Bill is taller than Chris, and John is taller than him (=Chris), too.
(1) a. John is tall. / Bill is tall.
b. John is taller than Bill.
(2) Joh is t ll.≈Joh s̓ hei ht reaches and xceeds the deg ee that is c sidered to
be th standard for ln ss, or “norm”, in the context.
3 a. John is even taller th n B ll.
. Bill is tall.
c. John is much taller than Bill.
4 Dubai is r a hing for the sky once again, with the developer f the worldʼs tallest
building vowing to build n even t lle tower bedecked with rotating balconies
and elevated landscaping spired by the mythical hanging gardens of Babyl n.
(emph is mine, Guardian, Apr l 10, 2016)
5 Hi psych -therapy has made him happier than he used to be, as well as calmer,
better tempered, more loving toward his wife, and more effic ent at work He is
etter looking, even. (Bennet (1982: 409))
6 Assumptio : Bill is {not tall/s ort}.
a. #I J hn ev n taller than Bill?
b #If John is ven talle tha B ll, he (=John) will be a new member of our
basketball team.
c. #It is not the case that John is even taller than Bill.
3)
(7) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him (=Bill)).
b. And none of them is tall.
(8) Bill is taller than Chris, and John is taller than him (=Chris), too.
1 a . / Bill is tall.
taller than Bill.
(2) John is tall.≈Jo n̓ s h ig t reach s and xce ds the degree that is considered to
be the standard for tallness, or “norm”, in the context.
(3) a John is ven taller than Bill.
Bill is tall.
c. John is much taller than Bill.
4 Dub i i eac ing f r th sky once again, with th dev loper of the worldʼs tall st
uilding vowing to build a ev n taller tow r be ecked with otating balconie
and elevated landscaping i spired by the mythical hanging gardens of Babylon.
(em has ine, Gu rdian, April 10, 2016)
5 His psych - herapy has made him happier tha he used to be, as well as calmer,
tempered, mor lovi g toward his wife, a d more efficient at work. He is
better looking, even. (Bennet (1982: 409))
(6) Assumpti : Bill is {not all/short}.
s v n taller than Bill?
#If John is v n t ller than Bill, h (=John) will be a new member f our
basketball team.
c. #I is not the case that John is even taller t an Bill.
3)
(7) a Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him (=Bill)).
b. And none of them is tall.
(8) Bill is taller than Chris, and John is taller than him (=Chris), too.
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In (6), under the assumption that the compared individual is not tall (or short), the 
sentences sound awkward, since they make sense only if they presuppose that Bill is 
tall.
 The second property of even-comparatives also concerns presupposition:  when 
they are preceded by another comparative sentence, the norm-related presupposition 
disappears.
(7a) can be followed by (7b) without any awkwardness.  Assuming that 
even-comparatives always require a presupposition to be satisfied, this means that 
the presupposition of even-comparatives can be satisfied by either of two different 
propositions:  one is a positive sentence, the other is a comparative with no 
norm-relatedness. This is by no means a usual situation for presupposition 
satisfaction.
 The third observation with regard to even-comparatives is that when they are 
preceded by another comparative, as in (7a), the compared element is optional and it 
is understood to refer to the subject DP of the preceding comparative. In (7a) above, 
it should be possible in principle for the pronoun to refer either to Chris or Bill, but 
its reference is confined to Bill. With other additive particles, such as too, reference 
to Chris is natural:
Thus, the requirement is not reducible to some general discourse principle.
 In sum, even-comparatives exhibit different properties than ordinary ones in 
three respects:
(1) a. John is tall. / Bill is tall.
b. John is taller than Bill.
(2) John is tall.≈John̓ s height reaches and exceeds the degree that is considered to
be the standard for tallness, or “norm”, in the context.
(3) a. John is even taller than Bill.
b. Bill is tall.
c. John is much taller than Bill.
(4) Dubai is reaching for the sky once again, with the developer of the worldʼs tallest
building vowing to build an even taller tower bedecked with rotating balconies
and elevated landscaping inspired by the mythical hanging gardens of Babylon.
(emphasis mine, Guardian, April 10, 2016)
(5) His psycho-therapy has made him happier than he used to be, as well as calmer,
better tempered, more loving toward his wife, and more efficient at work. He is
better looking, even. (Bennet (1982: 409))
(6) Assumption: Bill is {not tall/short}.
a. #Is John even taller than Bill?
b. #If John is even taller than Bill, he (=John) will be a new member of our
basketball team.
c. #It is not the case that John is even taller than Bill.
3)
(7) a. Bill is t ller than Chris, and John is even taller (tha him (=Bill)).
b. And none of them is tall.
(8) Bill is taller than Chris, and J hn is tall r than him (=Chri ), too.
(1) a John is tall. / Bill is tall.
b taller than Bill.
2 John s tall.≈John̓ s height reaches and exceeds th degree that is c nsidered to
e the standard for tallness, or “norm”, in the context.
(3) a. John is even taller than Bill.
b. Bill is tall.
c. John is much taller than Bill.
(4) Dubai is reaching for the sky once again, with the developer of the worldʼs tallest
building vowing to build an even taller tower bedecked with rotating balconies
and elevated landscaping inspired by the mythical hanging gardens of Babylon.
(emphasis mine, Gu rdian, April 10, 2016)
(5) His psycho-therapy has made him happier than he used to be, as well as calmer,
better tempered, more loving toward his wife, and more efficient at work. He is
better looking, even. (Bennet (1982: 409))
(6) Assumption: Bill is {not tall/short}.
a. #Is John even taller than Bill?
b. #If John is ven taller than Bill, he (=John) will be a new member of our
basketball team.
c. #It is not the case that John is even taller than Bill.
3)
(7) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him (=Bill)).
b. And none of them is tall.
8) Bill is taller than Chris, and John is taller than him (=Chris), too.
(1) John is tall. / Bi s tall.
John is tall r than Bill.
(2) John is tall.≈John̓ s h ight reaches and exceeds the degr e that is considered to
he standard for talln ss, or “norm”, in the context.
3 a J h is even taller h n Bill.
b Bill is tall.
c John is much taller than Bill.
(4) Dubai is reaching for the sky once again, with the developer of the worldʼs tallest
building vowing to build an even taller tower bedecked with rotating balconies
nd elevated landscaping in pire by the mythical hanging gardens of Babylon.
(emphasis mine, Guardian, April 10, 2016)
5 H s p ycho-therapy a ma e him appier than he used to be, as well as calmer,
better tempered, more loving toward his w fe, and more efficien at work. He is
b tter l oking, even. (Bennet (1982: 409))
(6) Assumption: Bill is {not tall/short}.
. #Is John even taller than Bill?
b. #If John is even taller than Bill, he (=J hn) will be a new member of our
asketball tea .
c. #It is not the case that John is even taller than Bill.
3)
(7) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him (=Bill)).
b. And none of them is tall.
(8) Bill is taller than Chris, and John is taller than him (=Chris), too.
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　(i) They induce a norm-related presupposition, when asserted out of the blue.
　(ii)  In spite of (i), when preceded by a comparative sentence, the norm-relatedness 
disappears.
　(iii)  In the situation of (ii), the reference of the compared element is restricted to 
the subject DP of the preceding comparative.
 In the next section, I will show that these properties cannot be derived from the 
standard analysis of focus particle even.
2.2  Focus semantics and even-comparatives
Even, as a focus particle, is associated with a focused element in a sentence, inducing 
presuppositions (Jackendoff 1972). The consensus about the semantic-pragmatic 
effects of this particle is that it does not contribute to the assertive/at-issue meaning 
of the sentence, but only conveys presuppositions (e.g., Horn (1969), Karttunen and 
Peters (1979)).
 The presuppositions that even produces have been known to be two-hold: (i) 
scalar presupposition, where the prejacent proposition (a proposition without even) 
is assumed to be the most noteworthy/surprising one, and (ii) additive presupposition, 
where something/one other than the focused element is an argument of predication 
that forms a part of the proposition (e.g., Horn 1969, Jackendoff 1972, Karttunen 
and Peters 1979, Bennet 1982, Kay 1990) 4).   The focused element is indicated by 
capital letters throughout this paper. In the following example, with the subject DP 
focused, the assertion, scalar PSP, and additive PSP will be as follows:
 I follow the alternative semantics (Rooth (1985, 1992)) in the formulation of 
focus-induced interpretations. Even takes two arguments, one of which is a 
contextual variable, C, a subset of the focus value of the prejacent, and the other is 
simply a prejacent proposition5).
(9) Even JOHN came to the party.
a. John came to the party. assertion
b. John is the most surprising person to come to the party. scalar PSP
c. Someone other than John came to the party. additive PSP
(10) even(C)(p)=1, iff
a. p=1, defin d only if...
b. ∀q∈C∧p≠q, q<noteworthiness p scalar PSP
c. ∃q∈C∧p≠q such that q=1 additive PSP
(11) a. C⊂JOHN came to the partyf
={q | q=λx. x came to the party)(y∈ALT(John))}
={John came to the party, Mary came to the party, Sam came to the
party}
b. Even JOHN came to the party=1 iff...
Assertion: John came to the party=1, defined only if...
Scalar PSP:
∀q∈{Mary came to the party, Sam came to the party},
q<noteworthiness John came to the party
Additive PSP: ∃q∈{Mary came to the party, Sam came to the party}
such that q=1
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The contextual variable C is presuppositional, in that its reference is gained from the 
context. In the case at hand, the propositions in C are obtained by replacing a 
focused element in the prejacent with a variable of the same type and substituting it 
with an entity in the set of alternatives to the focused element (= the focus semantic 
value,   f ). Given that ALT(John) = { John, Mary, Sam } for (9), then its assertion, 
scalar PSP and additive PSP will be calculated as follows:
It is easy to see that these results conform to the observation in (9b) and (9c).
 Now let us consider even-comparatives. Applying the same computation to 
even-comparatives, we would get the following:
(9) Even JOHN came to the party.
a. John came to the party. assertion
b. John is the most surprising person to come to the party. scalar PSP
c. Someone other than John came to the party. additive PSP
(10) even(C)(p)=1, iff
a. p=1, defined only if...
b. ∀q∈C∧p≠q, q<noteworthiness p scalar PSP
c. ∃q∈C∧p≠q such that q=1 additive PSP
(11) a. C⊂JOHN came to the partyf
={q | q=λx. x cam to the party)(y∈ALT(J hn))}
={John cam to the party, Mary came to the party, Sam came o the
party}
b. Even JOHN came to the party=1 iff...
Assert on: John cam to the party=1, defined only if...
Scalar PSP:
∀q∈{Mary came to the party, Sam came to the party},
q<noteworthiness John came to the party
Additive PSP: ∃q∈{Mary came to the party, Sam came to the party}
such that q=1
(9) Even JOHN came to the party.
a. John came to the party. ass rtion
b. John is the most surprising person to come to the party. scalar PSP
c. Someone other than John came to the party. ad itive PSP
(10) even(C)(p)=1, iff
a. p=1, defined only if...
∀q∈C∧p≠q, q<noteworthiness p scala PSP
c. ∃q∈C∧p≠q such that q=1 additive PSP
(11) a. C⊂JOHN came to the partyf
={q | q=λx. x came to the party)(y∈ALT(John))}
={John came to the party, Mary cam to the p rty, Sam cam to he
party}
b. Even JOHN came to the party=1 iff...
Assertion: John came to the party=1, defined only if...
Scalar PSP:
∀q∈{Mary came to the party, Sam came to the party},
q<noteworthiness John came to the party
Additive PSP: ∃q∈{Mary came to the party, Sam came to the party}
such that q=1
(12) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Assume that ALT(Bill) ={Bill, Sam, Mary}
C⊂ John is taller than BILLf
={q | q = (λx. John is taller than x)(y∈ALT(Bill))}
={John is taller than Bill, John is taller than Sam, John is taller than
Mary}
b. Assertion of (12): John is taller than Bill
c. Scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary},
q<noteworthiness John is taller than Bill
d. Additive PSP: ∃q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary}
∧q = 1
(13) Informativeness
Let P and Q be propositions. If P entails Q but Q does not entail P, then P is
more informative than Q.
(14) HEIGHT 0̶̶̶̶̶Sam̶̶Mary̶̶Bill̶̶John̶̶̶>
a. John is taller than Bill. ⇒ ⇍
b. John is taller than Mary.
c. John is taller than Sam.
(15) Bill is taller than his alternatives.
(16) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him).
b. And none of them is tall.
(17) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Bill is tall. ≈Bill̓ s height≥ds (=the contextually given degree of
standard for being “tall”)
b. Bill is taller than someone. ≈Bill̓ s height>someone else̓ s height
6
Are these results in congruity with the observation in the last section?
 The additive PSP just says that John is taller than other people than Bill, and 
thus it does not ensure the norm-relatedness. I will not discuss the additive PSP 
hereafter and simply assume that it holds, because it does not play a crucial role in 
the present discussion.
 What about the scalar PSP? What does it mean that the proposition that John is 
taller than Bill is the most noteworthy/surprising proposition among these? 
Following Kay (1990), I take “noteworthiness” as informativeness, and define it in 
terms of anti-symmetric entailment relation (cf. Zhang and Ling 2016):
 With this characterization of noteworthiness, the scalar PSP says that the 
prejacent proposition entails the alternative propositions. In the model at hand, this 
entailment relation is satisfied only when Bill is taller than the other two:
In (14), (14a) entails (14b) and (14c),but neither of the latter two entails (14a). Thus, 
in this relation (14a) is the most informative, according to (13). Thus, the scalar PSP 
would be restated as follows:
(12) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Assume that ALT(Bill) ={Bill, Sam, Mary}
C⊂ John is taller than BILLf
={q | q = (λx. John is taller than x)(y∈ALT(Bill))}
={John is taller than Bill, John is taller than Sam, John is taller than
Mary}
b. Assertion of (12): John is taller than Bill
c. Scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary},
q<noteworthiness John is taller than Bill
d. Additive PSP: ∃q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary}
∧q = 1
(13) Informativeness
Let P and Q be propositions. If P entails Q but Q do s not entail P, then P is
more informative tha Q.
(14) HEIGHT 0̶̶̶̶̶Sam̶̶Mary̶̶Bill̶̶John̶̶̶>
a. J hn is taller than Bill. ⇒ ⇍
b. John is aller than Mary.
c. John is taller than Sam.
(15) Bill is taller than his alternatives.
(16) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him).
b. And none of them is tall.
(17) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Bill is tall. ≈Bill̓ s height≥ds (=the contextually given degree of
st ndard for being “tall”)
b. Bill is taller than someone. ≈Bill̓ s height>someone else̓ s height
(12) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Assume that ALT(Bill) ={Bill, Sam, Mary}
C⊂ Joh is taller an BILLf
={q | q = (λx. Joh is taller han x)(y∈ALT(Bill))}
={John s taller than Bill, John is taller than Sam, Jo n is taller than
Mary}
b. Assert of (12): John is taller than Bil
c Scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary},
q<noteworthiness John is taller than Bill
d Addit ve PSP: ∃q∈{John is taller than Sa , John i taller than Mary}
∧q = 1
(13) Informativeness
Let P and Q be proposition . If P entails Q but Q does not entail P, then P is
more i formative t an Q.
4 HEIGHT 0̶̶̶̶̶Sam̶̶Mary̶̶Bill̶̶John̶̶̶>
John s er than Bill. ⇒ ⇍
b. John is taller than Mary.
c John is taller than Sam.
(15) Bill is taller than his alternatives.
(16) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him).
b. And none of them is tall.
(17) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Bill is tal . ≈Bill̓ s height≥ds (=the contextually given degree of
standard for being “tall”)
b. Bill is taller than someone. ≈Bill̓ s height>someone else̓ s height
(12) J hn is even tall r than BILL.
a. A sume that ALT(Bill) ={Bill, Sam, Mary}
C⊂ J hn is taller t an BILLf
={q | q = (λx. John is taller than x)(y∈ALT(Bill))}
={J hn is taller than Bill, John is ta er than Sam, John is taller than
Mary}
b. Assertion of (12): John is aller than Bill
c. Sc lar PSP: ∀q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary},
q<noteworthiness John is taller than Bill
d Additive PSP: ∃q∈{Joh is taller than Sam, Joh is taller than Mary}
∧q = 1
3 Informati ess
Let P and Q be p opos tions. If P entails Q but Q does not entail P, then P
more inf rmativ than Q.
(14) HEIGHT 0̶̶̶̶̶Sam̶̶Mary̶̶Bill̶̶John̶̶̶>
a. John is aller than Bill. ⇒ ⇍
b. John is taller than Mary.
c John is taller than Sam.
(15) Bill is taller than his alternatives.
(16) is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than h m).
b. And none of them is tall.
(17) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Bill is tall. ≈Bill̓ s height≥ds (=the contextually given degree of
standard for being “tall”)
b. Bill is taller than someone. ≈Bill̓ s height>someone else̓ s height
(12) John is even ta ler than BILL.
a ssume that ALT(Bill) ={Bill, Sam, Mary}
C⊂ J hn is t ller t an BILLf
={q | q = (λx. John is taller than x)(y∈ALT(Bill))}
={J hn i taller than Bill, John is ta er than Sam, John is taller than
Mary}
sse tion f (12): John is taller than Bill
c. Scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary},
q<noteworthiness Joh is taller than Bill
d Add ve PSP: ∃q∈{John is taller than Sam, Jo is tall r han Mary}
∧q = 1
3 Informativeness
Let P and Q be p oposi io s. If P entails Q but Q does not entail P, then P is
more informativ than Q.
(14) HEIGHT 0̶̶̶̶̶Sam̶̶Mary̶̶Bill̶̶John̶̶̶>
a. John is aller than Bill. ⇒ ⇍
b. John is tal er than Mary.
c John is er than Sam.
(15) Bill is taller than his alternatives.
(16) is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than h m).
b. And none of them is tall.
(17) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Bill is tall. ≈Bill̓ s height≥ds (=the contextually given degree of
standard for being “tall”)
b. Bill is taller than someone. ≈Bill̓ s height>someone else̓ s height
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 This restated PSP explains why a comparative sentence satisfies the 
presupposition of even-comparatives. In (7), repeated here as (16), that Bill is taller 
than another person is supplied, and thus the presupposition for the even-comparative 
is satisfied.
Furthermore, the restated presupposition in (15) does not require Bill to be tall:  All 
of Sam, Mary, Bill and John may be short.
 The point, however, counters to the observation (i) in section 2.1. When (3a) is 
asserted out of the blue, the presupposition associated with it is the norm-related 
one:  Bill has to be taller than some standard of height.
 In sum, the standard analysis of even as a focus particle may predict the 
comparative presupposition with no norm-relatedness, but it does not explain why 
we get the norm-relatedness in other contexts.
3  Computing Alternatives
3.1  Degree Alternatives
In the last section, we have seen that from the standard analysis of even, we cannot 
predict why we have the norm-related presupposition. In this section, we reconsider 
what may serve as alternatives and present the shared presupposition between the 
norm-related and norm-unrelated ones.
 Let us first take a look at the rough semantic representations of the presuppositions 
associated with even-comparatives.
It is now easily observable that the common value is that Bill’s height is greater than 
some other degree, not individuals. Thus the two presuppositions now can be unified 
(12) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Assume that ALT(Bill) ={Bill, Sam, Mary}
C⊂ John is taller than BILLf
={q | q = (λx. John is taller than x)(y∈ALT(Bill))}
={John is taller than Bill, John is taller than Sam, John is taller than
Mary}
b. Assertion of (12): John is taller than Bill
c. Scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary},
q<noteworthiness John is taller than Bill
d. Additive PSP: ∃q∈{John is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary}
∧q = 1
(13) Informativeness
Let P and Q be propositions. If P entails Q but Q does not entail P, then P is
more informative than Q.
(14) HEIGHT 0̶̶̶̶̶Sam̶̶Mary̶̶Bill̶̶John̶̶̶>
a. John is taller than Bill. ⇒ ⇍
b. John is taller than Mary.
c. John is taller than Sam.
(15) Bill is taller than his alternatives.
(16) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller (than him).
b. And none of them is tall.
(17) John is ven taller than BILL.
a. Bill is tall. ≈Bill̓ s height≥ds (=the contextually given degree of
standard fo being “tall”)
b. Bill is ta ler than someone. ≈Bill̓ height>someone else̓ s height
(12) John is even ta ler th n BILL.
a. Assume that ALT(Bill) ={Bill, Sam, Mary}
C⊂ Jo n is taller than BILLf
={q | q = (λx. John is taller than x)(y∈ALT(Bill))}
={John is taller than Bill, John is tall r than Sam, John is taller than
Mary}
b. Assertion of (12): John is taller than Bill
c. Scalar PSP: ∀q∈{J hn is taller than Sam, John is taller than Mary},
q<noteworthiness John is taller than Bill
d. Additiv PSP: ∃q∈{J hn is taller tha Sam, John is taller t a M ry}
∧q = 1
(13) Informativeness
Let P and Q be pr positions. If P entails Q but Q does n t e tail P, then P is
more informative than Q.
(14) HEIGHT 0̶̶̶̶̶Sam̶̶Mary̶̶Bill̶̶John̶̶̶>
a. John is taller than Bill. ⇒ ⇍
b. John is taller than Mary.
c. John is taller than Sam.
(15) Bill is taller than his alter atives.
(16) a. Bill is t l er than Chris, and John is ev n taller (than him).
b. And none of them is tall.
(17) John is even taller than BILL.
a. Bill is tall. ≈Bill̓ s height≥ds (=the contextually given degree of
standard for being “tall”)
b. Bill is taller than someone. ≈Bill̓ s height>someone else̓ s height
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into the following:
If (18) is the presuppositions of even-comparatives, they do not have two different 
presuppositions any more. We can assume that d* is a free degree variable, and as 
such its reference is determined by assignment function g, predicting that it varies 
depending on the preceding context. The problem is how to compute this 
presupposition compositionally.
 As a first step, let us incorporate degree alternatives into the semantics of even 
given above.
This amounts to saying that Bill’s height is greater than any other degrees that John 
exceeds, which is the same result as the standard analysis. What is in need is direct 
reference to the alternative degree(s) without making an intervention of universal 
quantification to propositions.
3.2  Non-propositional Presupposition Computation
In the above discussion, I take even as a sentential operator that takes C as its domain 
of quantification. In the literature, there is another way to derive a focus-induced 
presupposition, whereby a focus-sensitive presupposition trigger may be attached to 
syntactically various positions, introducing the relevant argument into the 
presupposition.6) Ippolito (2007), for example, argues that different meanings 
(temporal, marginal, and discourse-related/concessive readings) of still are due to the 
different positions to which this particle adjoins.
(18) Bill̓ s height>d*, d* could be the degree of standard or some degree
mentioned earlier
(19) a. C⊂John s taller than BILLf={q | q=(λd. J hn is taller than d)
(d′∈ALT(Bill̓ s height))}={Jo n̓ s height>Bill̓ s height, John̓ s height
>d1, Joh̓ s height>d2, ....}
b. scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John̓ s height>d1, John̓ s height>d2, ....},
q<noteworthiness John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
(20) a. John is still cooking. temporal
stillc,g,w=λt∈Di. λe∈Dl. λP∈Dl, i, t:∃t′<tP(e)(t′)=1. P(e)(t)
=1
b. Compact cars are still safe; subcompacts start to get dangerous.
marginal
stillc,g=λx.λP: ∃y≠x∃d. C(d)∧P(y)≥d.∃d. C(d)∧P(x)≥d.
c. Even if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will still run the marathon.
concessive
s illc,g,w=λp∈Ds, t. λq∈Ds, t: max≤,wc{w: w∈p∧w∈q}<likely
max≤,wc{w: w∈¬p∧w∈q}. q(w)=1.
(21) LF: Disc IP ... still(20c) IP PRES AspP still(20a) Asp′ ing VP/AdjP
still(20b)VP/AdjP ...
(22) a. We will have pizza o John̓ s birthd y, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza ag
on Mary̓ s birthday.
b. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza on
Mary̓ s birthday.
(18) Bill̓ s height>d*, d* could be th degree of standard or some degr e
menti ned earlier
(19) a. C⊂John is taller than BILLf={q | q=(λd. John is taller than d)
(d′∈ALT(Bill̓ s height))}={John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height, John̓ s height
>d1, Joh̓ s height>d2, ....}
b. scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John̓ s height>d1, John̓ s height>d2, ....},
q<noteworthiness J hn̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
(20) a. John is still cooking. temp ral
stillc,g,w=λt Di. λe∈Dl. λP∈Dl, i, t:∃t′<tP(e)(t′)=1. P(e)(t)
=1
b. Compact cars are still safe; subcompacts art to get dangerous.
marginal
stillc,g=λx.λP: ∃y≠x∃d. C(d)∧P(y)≥d.∃d. C(d)∧P(x)≥d.
c Even f t e doctor t lls him not to, Harry will stil run the marathon.
concessive
stillc,g,w=λp∈Ds, t. λq∈Ds, t: max≤, c{w: w∈p∧w∈q}<likely
m x≤,wc{w: w∈¬p∧w∈q}. q(w)=1.
21) LF: Disc IP ...  till(20c) IP PRES AspP still(20a) Asp′ ing VP/AdjP
still(20b)VP/AdjP ...
(22) a. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza again
on Mary̓ s birthday.
b. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza on
Mary̓ s birthday.
(18) Bill̓ s height>d*, d* could be the degree of standard or some degree
mentioned earlier
(19) a C⊂John is taller than BILLf={q | q=(λd. John is t ll r than d)
(d′∈ALT(Bill̓ height))}={John̓ s height>Bill̓ s hei ht, John̓ s height
>d1, Joh̓ s height>d2, ....}
b. scalar SP: ∀q∈{John̓ s height>d1, John̓ s he ght> 2, ....},
q<noteworthiness John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
0 John is still cooking. temporal
stillc,g,w=λ ∈Di λe∈Dl. λP∈Dl, i, t:∃t′<tP(e)(t′)=1. P(e)(t)
=1
b. Compact cars are still safe; subcompacts start to get dangerous.
marginal
stillc,g=λx.λP: ∃y≠x∃d. C(d)∧P(y)≥d.∃d. C(d)∧P(x)≥d.
c. Even if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will still run the marathon.
concessive
stillc,g,w=λp∈Ds, t. λq∈Ds, t: max≤,wc{w: w∈p∧w∈q}<likely
max≤,wc{w: w∈¬p∧w∈q}. q(w)=1.
(21) LF: Disc IP ... still(20c) IP PRES AspP still(20a) Asp′ ing VP/AdjP
still(20b)VP/AdjP ...
(22) a. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza again
on Mary̓ s birthday.
b. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza on
Mary̓ s birthday.
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For example, the temporal reading in (20a) is obtained when still is attached to AspP, 
taking [Asp′ John cooking] in its scope, while the marginal reading in (20b) takes 
DegP/AdjP in its scope. The concessive reading arises when still is higher up in the 
propositional level, affecting the assertive force of that proposition.
 In this analysis, the triggered presuppositions differ accordingly:  when still is 
an aspectual adverb as in (20a), the presupposition refers to the temporal ordering 
between two temporal arguments (t′ and t), while when it takes propositional scope, 
the presupposition is associated with the (unlikeliness) ordering between 
propositions. The first argument of still is assumed to be a focused phrase, and the 
other argument in the presupposition are alternative to that phrase. Thus, the 
syntactic (LF) position of the focus particle determines the type of its alternatives.
 While in Ippolito (2007) the presupposed time variable (= t′ in (20a) in temporal 
reading is existentially bound, Beck (2016) takes that argument to be free. This is 
because the presupposition induced by still is not about just some time before the 
prejacent event, but about some specific time, yesterday, for example. The same 
discussion applies to the presupposition gained by again. The following is taken 
from Heim (1990), attributed originally to Kripke.
(18) Bill̓ s height>d*, d* could be the degree of standard or some degree
mentioned earlier
(19) a. C⊂John is taller than BILLf={q | q=(λd. John is taller than d)
(d′∈ALT(Bill̓ s height))}={John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height, John̓ s height
>d1, Joh̓ s height>d2, ....}
b. scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John̓ s height>d1, John̓ s height>d2, ....},
q<noteworthiness John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
(20) a. John is still cooking. temporal
stillc,g,w=λt∈Di. λe∈Dl. λP∈Dl, i, t:∃t′<tP(e)(t′)=1. P(e)(t)
=1
b. Compact cars are still safe; subcompacts start to get dangerous.
marginal
stillc,g=λx.λP: ∃y≠x∃d. C(d)∧P(y)≥d.∃d. C(d)∧P(x)≥d.
c. Even if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will still run the marathon.
concessive
stillc,g,w=λp∈Ds, t. λq∈Ds, t: max≤,wc{w: w∈p∧w∈q}<likely
max≤,wc{w: w∈¬p∧w∈q}. q(w)=1.
(21) LF: Disc IP ... still(20c) IP PRES AspP still(20a) Asp′ ing VP/AdjP
still(20b)VP/AdjP ...
(22) a. We will have pizza on John̓ s b rthday, so e shouldn̓ t have pizza again
on Mary̓ s birthday.
b. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, o w shouldn̓ t have pizza on
Mary̓ s birthday.
(18) Bill̓ s height>d*, d* could be the degree of standard or some degree
mentioned earlier
(19) a. C⊂John is taller than BILLf={q | q=(λd. John is taller than d)
(d′∈ALT(Bill̓ s height))}={John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height, John̓ s height
>d1, Jo s̓ height>d2, ....}
b. scalar PSP: ∀q∈{J hn̓ s eight>d1, John̓ s height>d2, ....},
q<noteworthiness Joh s̓ height>Bill̓ s height
(20) a. John is still cooking. temporal
stillc,g,w=λt∈Di. λe∈Dl. λP∈Dl, i, t:∃t′<tP( )(t′)=1. P(e)(t)
=1
b. Compact cars are still safe; subcompacts start to get dangerous.
marginal
stillc,g=λx.λP: ∃y≠x∃d. C(d)∧P(y)≥d.∃d. C(d)∧P(x)≥d.
. Even if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will still run the marathon.
concessive
stillc,g,w=λp∈Ds, t. λq∈Ds, t: max≤,wc{w: w∈p∧w∈q}<likely
max≤,wc{w: w∈¬p∧w∈q}. q(w)=1.
(21) LF: Disc IP ... still(20c) IP PRES AspP still(20a) Asp′ ing VP/AdjP
still(20b)VP/AdjP ...
(22) a. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza again
on Mary̓ s birthday.
b. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza on
Mary̓ s birthday.
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The crucial observation is that the natural interpretation of (22a) is that John’s 
birthday precedes Mary’s, while without again, as in (22b), this does not have to be 
so. Beck (2007) argues that this is explained by the introduction of an index to again 
at LF, which is interpreted to be a free variable whose reference has to be assigned in 
the context by assignment function g:
 Applying this to the temporal interpretation of still, we would get the following 
(cf. Beck 2016):
Without an existential quantification in the presupposition, this is the most natural 
way to get an anaphoric interpretation of the temporal variable.
 In the next section, I propose that this free variable approach should be applied 
to even-comparatives, and show that the proposed analysis explains the observation 
in 2.1.
4  Proposal
4.1  Free Degree Variable Approach
Let me first present the assumptions that I make here. I assume the following LF for 
comparative sentences:
(18) Bill̓ s height>d*, d* could be the degree of standard or some degree
mentioned earlier
(19) a. C⊂John is taller than BILLf={q | q=(λd. John is taller than d)
(d′∈ALT(Bill̓ s height))}={John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height, John̓ s height
>d1, Joh̓ s height>d2, ....}
b. scalar PSP: ∀q∈{John̓ s height>d1, John̓ s height>d2, ....},
q<noteworthiness John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
(20) a. John is still cooking. temporal
stillc,g,w=λt∈Di. λe∈Dl. λP∈Dl, i, t:∃t′<tP(e)(t′)=1. P(e)(t)
=1
b. Compact cars are still safe; subcompacts start to get dangerous.
marginal
stillc,g=λx.λP: ∃y≠x∃d. C(d)∧P(y)≥d.∃d. C(d)∧P(x)≥d.
c. Even if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will still run the marathon.
concessive
stillc,g,w=λp∈Ds, t. λq∈Ds, t: max≤,wc{w: w∈p∧w∈q}<likely
max≤,wc{w: w∈¬p∧w∈q}. q(w)=1.
(21) LF: Disc IP ... still(20c) IP PRES AspP still(20a) Asp′ ing VP/AdjP
still(20b)VP/AdjP ...
(22) a. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza again
on Mary̓ s birthday.
b. We will have pizza on John̓ s birthday, so we shouldn̓ t have pizza on
Mary̓ s birthday.
(23) a. again = λt′.λp.λt.λw: p(t′)(w)∧t′<t. p(t)(w)
b. PRES 1 we have pizza again̓  t1g (w)= if we have pizza at g(t′)
in w∧g(t′)<tnow, we have pizza at tnowin w.
c. g(t′)=John̓ s birthday
(24) a. LF: IP PRES 1 still′ t1 AspP ing VP John cook
b. stillg=λt′.λt. λp∈Di, t: t′<t∧p(t′). p(t)
c. (24a)g=John cooking at tnow is true, defined only if
g(t′)<tnow and John cooking at g(t′) is true.











than OP1 Bill is t1 tall
max
-er
b. -er=λd.λd′. d′>d Beck (2010)
c. max(D):=ιd∈D. ∀d′∈D. d′≤d, where D is a set of degrees.
von Stechow (1984)
(26) . tall=λd.λx. x is d-tall
b. thanP=λd. Bill is d-tall
c. XP=max(λd. Bill is d-tall) (=Bill̓ s height)
d. IP=max(λd′. John is d′-tall) (=John̓ s height)
e. (25a)=max(λd′. John is d′-tall)>max(λd. Bill is d-tall)
=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
(23) a again = λt′.λp.λt.λw: p(t′)(w)∧t′<t. p(t)(w)
b. PRES 1 we have pizza again̓  t1g (w)= if we have pizza at g(t′)
in w∧g(t′)<tnow, we have pizza at tnowin w.
c g( ′)=John̓ s birthday
(24) a. LF: IP PRES 1 still′ t1 AspP ing VP John cook
b. stillg=λt′.λt. λp∈Di, t: t′<t∧p(t′). p(t)
c. (24a)g=John cooking at tnow is true, defined only if
g(t′)<tnow and John cooking at g(t′) is true.











than OP1 Bill is t1 tall
max
-er
b. - r=λd.λd′. d′>d Beck (2010)
c m x(D):=ιd∈D. ∀d′∈D. d′≤d, where D is a set of degrees.
von Stechow (1984)
(26) a tall=λd.λx. x is d-tall
b thanP λd. Bill is d-tall
c. XP=max(λd. Bill i d-tall) (=Bill̓ s height)
d. IP=max(λd′. John is d′-tall) (=John̓ s height)
e. (25a)=max(λd′. John is d′-tall)>max(λd. Bill is d-tall)
=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
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(25a) is quite usual except for one thing:  the max-operator, whose denotation is 
given in (25c), is an LF object, rather than being incorporated into the semantics of 
the comparative morpheme as traditionally assumed. This is the proposal by Beck 
(2010), and I follow it.7) Accordingly, the comparative morpheme denotes just a 
relation between two degrees, of type 〈d, 〈d,t〉〉 (= (25b)). I also assume that the 
semantics of gradable adjectives is a relation between degrees and individuals. The 
semantic computation of (25a) is as follows:
 Now let us turn to even-comparatives. Since even scopes over the first degree 
argument of the comparative morpheme, I propose that it is situated above Deg’, 
with abstraction of the focused material 8): 
(23) a. again = λt′.λp.λt.λw: p(t′)(w)∧t′<t. p(t)(w)
b. PRES 1 we have pizza again̓  t1g (w)= if we have pizza at g(t′)
in w∧g(t′)<tnow, we have pizza at tnowin w.
c. g(t′)=John̓ s birthday
(24) a. LF: IP PRES 1 still′ t1 AspP ing VP John cook
b. stillg=λt′.λt. λp∈Di, t: t′<t∧p(t′). p(t)
c. (24a)g=John cooking at tnow is true, defined only if
g(t′)<tnow and John cooking at g(t′) is true.











than OP1 Bill is t1 tall
max
-er
b. -er=λd.λd′. d′>d Beck (2010)
c. max(D):=ιd∈D. ∀d′∈D. d′≤d, where D is a set of degrees.
von Stechow (1984)
6) a. tall=λd.λx. x is d-tall
b. thanP=λd. Bill is d-tall
c. XP=max(λd. Bill is d-tal ) (=Bill̓ s height)
d. IP=max(λd′. J hn is d′-tall) (=John̓ s h ight)
e. (25a)=max(λd′. John is d′-tall)>max(λd. Bill is d-t ll)
=John̓ s height>Bill̓ heigh
(23) a. again = λt′.λp.λt.λw: p(t′)(w)∧t′<t. p(t)(w)
b. PRES 1 we have pizza again̓  t1g (w)= if we have pizza at g(t′)
in w∧g( ′)<tnow, we have pizza at tnowin w.
c g(t′)=John̓ s birthday
(24) a. LF: IP PRES 1 still′ t1 AspP ing VP John cook
b. stillg=λt′.λt. λp∈Di, t: t′<t∧p(t′). p(t)
c. (24a)g=John cooking at tnow is true, defined only if
g(t′)<tnow and John cooking at g(t′) is true.











tha OP1 Bill is t1 tall
max
-er
b - r=λd.λd′. d′>d Beck (2010)
. max(D):=ι ∈D. ∀d′∈D. d′≤d, wh re D is a et of degrees.
von Stechow (1984)
(26) a. tall=λd.λx. x is d-tall
b. thanP=λd. Bill is d-tall
c. XP=max(λd. Bill is d-tall) (=Bill̓ s height)
d. IP=max(λd′. John is d′-tall) (=John̓ s height)
e. (25a)=max(λd′. John is d′-tall)>max(λd. Bill is d-tall)
=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
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In LF (27a), even bears index *, which is a syntactic reflex of a free variable. I 
propose that even has the denotation given in (27b). As in the cases of still and 
again, even takes as its first argument index *, which is to be interpreted as a free 
degree variable. Then it takes the comparative relation and turns it into a comparative 
relation with a scalar presupposition, without changing the type of the predicate. The 
scalar presupposition is crucially different from those we have seen above in that this 
free variable serves as one of the arguments of -er. The proposed analysis also says 
that even in even-comparatives does not universally quantify propositions but 
introduces a particular proposition into the presupposition.
 The computation is given below:
In (28c), we get the scalar presupposition that says:  That John’s height exceeds Bill’s 
height is more noteworthy than that John’s height exceeds some relevant degree in 
(27) John is even taller than BILL.
a. IP
IP









max λd. Bill is d-tall
b. even*=λd*.λD∈Dd, d, t.λdλd′: D(d)(d*) <noteworthiness D(d')(d).
D(d′)(d).
(28) a.  * λ1 -er t1g=λd.λd′: d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>d. d′>d.
b. DegPg =λd′. d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>Bill̓ s height. d′>Bill̓ s
height.
c. IPg=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... Joh s̓ heigh >g (d*) <noteworthiness John̓ s heig t
>B ll̓ s height
(29) John is even talle than BILL=1,
=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... John̓ s height>g(d*)<noteworthiness John̓ s height
>Bill̓ s height
=Bill̓ s height>g(d*)
(30) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller than him (=Bill, *Chris).
b. Bill̓ s height>Chris̓ s height
(27) John is even taller than BILL.
a. IP
IP









max λd. Bill is d-tall
b. even*=λd*.λD∈Dd, d, t.λdλd′: D(d)(d*) <noteworthiness D(d')(d).
D(d′)( ).
(28) a. even* λ1 -er t1g=λd.λd′: d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>d. d′>d.
b. DegPg =λd′. d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>Bill̓ s height. d′>Bill̓ s
height.
c IPg=Jo n̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... John̓ s height>g (d*) <noteworthiness John̓ s height
>Bill̓ s height
(29) John is even taller than BILL=1,
=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... John̓ s height>g(d*)<noteworthiness John̓ s height
>Bill̓ s height
=Bill̓ s height>g(d*)
(30) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller than him (=Bill, *Chris).
b. Bill̓ s height>Chris̓ s height
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the context. If we follow the definition of noteworthiness in (13), this is tantamount 
to saying that that Bill’s height exceeds some relevant degree in the context is 
presupposed.
4.2  Data Explained
The analysis of even-comparatives in the preceding section explains properties (i)-
(iii) in Section 2.1.
 Let us start with (ii) and (iii). In (28c), we have the following semantics:
When preceded by a comparative sentence, as in the following example, the most 
plausible candidate for d* is Chris’s height:
Thus, this explains how a comparative sentence satisfies the presupposition of 
even-comparatives. Furthermore, just like ordinary comparatives, Bill’s height > 
Chris’s height does not ensure that Bill is tall. This explains the norm-unrelated 
property of the comparative presupposition.
 This analysis also predicts property (iii): since the compared element is required 
to be taller than d*, the presupposition that “Chris’s height > d*” is not satisfied in 
this context, when we assume “him” = Chris.
 The norm-relatedness (property (i)) is also explained by assignment of 
reference. Let us see first how a positive adjective is related to the norm. Following 
von Stechow (1984), I assume that  a null degree head, pos, maps a gradable 
adjective to an individual-taking predicate, and at the same time it introduces the 
standard degree:
(27) John is even taller than BILL.
a. IP
IP









max λd. Bill is d-tall
b. even*=λd*.λD∈Dd, d, t.λdλd′: D(d)(d*) <noteworthiness D(d')(d).
D(d′)(d).
(28) a. even* λ1 -er t1g=λd.λd′: d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>d. d′>d.
b. DegPg =λd′. d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>Bill̓ s height. d′>Bill̓ s
height.
c. IPg=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... John̓ s height>g (d*) <noteworthiness John̓ s height
>Bill̓ s he ght
(29) John is even taller than BILL=1,
=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... John̓ s height>g(d*)<noteworthiness John̓ s height
>Bill̓ s height
=Bill̓ s height>g(d*)
(30) a. Bill is t ller than Chris, a d John i even taller than him (=Bill, *Chris).
b. B ll̓ s height>Chris̓ height
(27) John is even taller than BILL.
a. IP
IP









max λd. Bill is d-tall
b =λd*.λD∈Dd, d, t.λdλ ′: D(d)(d*) <noteworthiness D(d')(d).
D(d′)(d).
(28) a even* λ1 -er t1g=λd.λd′: d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>d. d′>d.
b. DegPg =λd′. d′>d*<noteworthiness d′>Bill̓ s height. d′>Bill̓ s
height.
c. IPg=John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... John̓ s height>g (d*) <noteworthiness John̓ s height
>Bill̓ s height
(29) John is even taller than BILL=1,
John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined only if... John̓ s height>g(d*)<noteworthiness John̓ s height
>B ll̓ s h ig t
=Bill̓ s height>g(d*)
(30) a. Bill is taller than Chris, and John is even taller than him (=Bill, *Chris).
b. Bill̓ s height>Chris̓ s height
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As may be seen from (31d), if there is a degree d such that Bill reaches d and 
exceeds ds, then the maximum degree of degrees that Bill’s height reaches has to be 
greater than ds. This conforms to the requirement of the presupposition in (29): Bill’s 
height has to be greater than g(d*). Thus, if g assigns d* to ds, the presupposition is 
satisfied.
 One might wonder why and how the standard degree, ds, is ensured being 
accommodated when it is not explicitly stated in the context. If the standard degree 
has been provided by the preceding discourse, as in (4), repeated below, it is the 
most plausible candidate for the referent of d*.
When asserted out of the blue, ds is usually accommodated. In the analysis here, d* 
is taken to be an alternative to the compared element, and thus it should be a degree 
comparable to the degree of the compared element. In the case at hand, Bill’s height 
is contrasted with other degrees on the height scale. Among these degrees, ds is 
considered to be more salient than other degrees on the scale unless an explicit 
reference to these degrees has been made, because it is the degree by which one can 
judge whether an individual is tall or not. Thus, without an explicit comparison, g 
assigns d* the standard degree, which results in the norm-relatedness.
 Before moving on to the next section, I would like to mention Umbach’s (2009) 
analysis of German noch ‘still’, and compare it with the proposal here. Umbach 
(2009) points out almost the same range of data in German, and proposes that noch 
in comparatives is a special case of additive use of the particle9): 
(31) a. Bill is tall.
b. LF: IP Bill is DegP Deg′ pos AP tall
c. pos=λG∈Dd, et.λx.∃d. G(x)(d)∧d≥ds
ds: the degree of standard for G in the context
d. (31a)=∃d. Bill is d-tall∧d≥ds
(32) Dubai is reaching for the sky once again, with the developer of t worldʼs
tallest building vowing to build an even taller tower bedeck d with rotating
balconies and elevated landscaping inspired by the mythical hanging garden
of Babylon. (emp sis mine, Guardian, April 10, 2016)
(33) AP noch AP größer=λyλx: height(y)> . height(x)>height(y).
(34) a. Adam ist größer als Chris. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻAd m s taller than Ch is. Berta is still taller than Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Adam>Chris, Berta>Adam
Height order: Berta>Adam>Chris
b. #Chris ist größer als Adam. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻChris is taller than Adam. Berta is still taller than Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Chris>Adam, Berta>Adam
Height order: Chris, Berta>Adam
(35) a. Even JOHN is taller than Bill.
b. J hn is not tall (short).
(36) a. AP taller than Bill=λx. height(x)>heig t(B)
b. even=λQ∈De, t.λx: Q(d). Q(x)
c. even DegP taller than Bill
=λx: d>hei ht(B). height(x)>height(B)
(31) a. Bill is tall.
b. LF: IP Bill is DegP Deg′ pos AP tall
c. pos=λG∈Dd, et.λx.∃d. G(x)(d)∧d≥ds
ds: the de e of standard for G in the context
d. (31a)=∃d. Bill is d-tall∧d≥d
(32) Dubai is reaching for he sky once again, with the developer of the worldʼs
tallest building vowing to build an ven taller tower bedecke with rotating
balconies and elevated landscaping inspired by the mythical hanging gardens
of Babylon. (e phasis mine, Guardian, April 10, 2016)
(33) AP noch AP größ r=λyλx: height(y)>d. height(x)>height(y).
(34) Adam ist größer als Chris. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻAdam is taller than Chris. Berta is till taller than Adam.ʼ
Ord r of mention: Adam>Chris, B rta>Adam
H ight order: Berta>Ad m>Chris
b #Chris ist größer als Adam. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻChris is tall r than Adam. Berta is still talle than Adam.ʼ
Order of men ion: Chris>Adam, Berta>Ada
H ight order: Chris Berta>Adam
(35) a. Even JOHN is t ll r th n B ll.
b. John is not tall (short).
(36) a. AP taller than Bill=λx. height(x)>height(B)
b. even=λQ∈De, t.λx: Q(d). Q(x)
c. even DegP taller than Bill
=λx: d>height(B). height(x)>height(B)
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What is “additive” for Umbach (2009) is the order of mention. In the following, (b) 
is not felicitous because only the former preserves the height order of Berta, Adam 
and Chris.
 This analysis has much in common with the analysis proposed here. There are, 
however, several points that I am not comfortable with10).   First of all, the additive 
presupposition of even does not help us to give the presupposition given in (33), 
because it must be something like “subject DP > ALT(compared element)”. Second, 
her analysis of noch does not seem to extend to cases where even is attached to the 
subject DP:
(35a) presupposes that (35b). Since Umbach (2009) takes noch in noch-comparatives 
as a case of additive use of the particle, the presupposition is just another 
comparison. In this case, the comparison should be made with the focused subject 
NP, yielding d > height(J). This result, however, cannot be obtained compositionally:
(31) a. Bill is tall.
b. LF: IP Bill is DegP Deg′ pos AP tall
c. pos=λG∈Dd, et.λx.∃d. G(x)(d)∧d≥ds
ds: the degree of standard for G in the context
d. (31a)=∃d. Bill is d-tall∧d≥ds
(32) Dubai is reaching for the sky once again, with the developer of the worldʼs
tallest building vowing to build an even taller tower bedecked with rotating
balconies and elevated landscaping inspired by the mythical hanging gardens
of Babylon. (emphasis mine, Guardian, April 10, 2016)
(33) AP noch AP größer=λyλx: height(y)>d. height(x)>height(y).
(34) a. Adam ist größer als Chris. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻAdam is taller than Ch is. Be ta is still taller t an Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Adam>Chris, Berta>Adam
Height order: Berta>Adam>Chris
b. #Chris ist größer als Adam. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻChris is taller than Adam. Berta is still taller than Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Chris>Adam, Berta>Adam
Height order: Chris, Berta>Adam
(35) a. Even JOHN is taller than Bill.
b. John is not tall (short).
(36) a. AP taller than Bill=λx. height(x)>height(B)
b. even=λQ∈De, t.λx: Q(d). Q(x)
c. even DegP t ller tha Bill
=λx: d>height(B). ight(x)>height(B)
(31) a Bill is tall.
b. LF: IP Bill is DegP Deg′ pos AP tall
c. pos=λG∈Dd, et.λx.∃d. G(x)(d)∧d≥ds
ds: the degree of standard for G i the context
d. (31a)=∃d. Bil is d-t ll∧d≥ds
(32) Dubai is reaching for the sky once again, with the developer of the worldʼs
tallest building vowing to build an even aller tow r bedecked with rotating
balconies and elevated landscaping inspired by the mythical hanging gardens
of Babylon. (emphasis mine, Guardi n, April 10, 2016)
(33) AP noch AP größer=λyλx: height(y) d. height(x)>height(y).
(34) a Adam ist größer als Chris. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
Adam is ta ler than Chris
Adam Chris
Be ta>Ad m>Chris
b. #Chris ist größer als Adam. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻChris is taller than Ad m. Berta is still taller than Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Chris>Adam, Berta>Adam
Height order: Chris, Berta>Adam
(35) a Even JOHN is taller than Bill
b John is not tall (shor ).
(36) a. AP taller a B ll=λx. height(x)>height(B)
b. even=λQ∈De, t.λx: Q(d). Q(x)
c. even DegP taller than Bill
=λx: d>height(B). height(x)>height(B)
1 a. Bill s tall.
. LF: IP Bill is DegP Deg′ pos AP tall
c pos=λG∈Dd, et.λx.∃d. G(x)( )∧d≥ds
ds: th degre of standard for G in the cont x
d. (31a)=∃d. Bill is d-tall∧d≥ds
2 Dubai is reaching fo the sky onc aga n, with the d veloper of the worldʼs
tallest bu lding vowing to bu ld an even taller tower bedecked with rotating
balconies and el vated lan scaping inspir d by the ythical hanging gardens
of Babylon. (emphasis min , Guardi n, April 10, 2016)
3 AP noch AP g ößer=λyλx: height(y)>d. height(x)>height(y).
(34) a. Adam ist größer als Ch is. Bert ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻAdam is taller than Chris. Berta is still taller than Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Ada >Chris, B rta>Adam
Height rd r: Berta>Adam>Chris
b. #Chris ist größer als Adam. Berta st noch größer als Adam.
ʻChris is taller than Adam. Berta is still taller than Ada .ʼ
Order of m nti n: Chris>Adam, Berta>Adam
Height ord r: Chris, Berta>Adam
(35) a. Even JOHN is taller than Bill.
b. John is not tall (short).
6) a. AP aller than Bill=λx. height(x)>height(B)
b. even=λQ∈De, t.λx: Q(d). Q(x)
c. even DegP taller th n Bill
=λx: d>height(B). height(x)>height(B)
(31) a. Bill is tall.
LF: IP Bill is D gP Deg′ pos AP tall
c. pos=λG∈Dd, et.λx.∃d. G(x)(d)∧d≥ds
ds: the egree f standard for G in the cont xt
d. (31a)=∃d. Bill is d-tall∧d≥d
2 Dubai is reachin for the sky onc gain, wi h the developer of the worldʼs
tallest buildi g vowing to build an even taller tower bedecked with rotating
balconies and el vated andscaping inspired by the mythical h nging gardens
of Babylon. (emp sis mine, Guardi n, April 10, 2016)
(33) AP noc AP rößer=λyλx: height(y)>d. eight(x)>heig t(y).
4 Adam t größer ls Chris t noch rößer als Adam.
ʻA am is taller than Chris. B rta is still taller than Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Adam>Chris, Berta>Adam
Height order: Berta>Adam>Chris
b #Chris ist größer als Adam. Berta ist noch größer als Adam.
ʻC ris is taller than Adam. Berta is still taller than Adam.ʼ
Order of mention: Chris>Adam, Berta>Adam
Heigh order: Chris, Berta>Adam
(35) a Even JOHN is taller th n ill.
b. John is not tall (short).
(36) a. AP taller than Bill=λx. height(x)>height(B)
b. even=λQ∈De, t.λx: Q(d). Q(x)
c. even DegP taller than Bill
=λx: d>height(B). height(x)>height(B)
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As shown in (36c), what we would get is the presupposition that some relevant 
degree is greater than the height of Bill, which is not what we need.
 In the analysis presented, a minimal revision would suffice to capture the fact:
Since even is higher than the subject DP, its type is changed accordingly. Then we 
would get the presupposition that d* > John’s height, because that John’s height is 
greater than Bill’s is more informative than that some other degree is greater than 
Bill’s height, and John’s height has to be shorter than that degree.
 Thus, the two proposals differ in that the present analysis derives the properties 
of even-comparatives from the scalar presupposition of the particle, while 
Umbach(2009) reduces the similar properties of noch-comparatives to additive use. 
It seems to me that Umbach’s (2009) analysis would work for German noch, but it 
cannot be true for even-comparatives.
5  Conclusion
This paper has focused on the seemingly peculiar behaviors of even-comparatives: 
that they may be associated either with a norm-related or norm-unrelated 
presupposition depending on the context, and when the norm-unrelated or 
comparative presupposition is satisfied, the subject NP of the presupposition has to 
be the compared element. I argue that these are derived by the scalar presupposition 
induced by even, but their computation is not as simple as traditionally assumed. I 
introduce a free degree variable into the presupposition of even-comparatives, which 
may refer to the (implicit) degree of standard or an explicitly mentioned degree in 
the preceding discourse. This explains why we have variable presupposition in the 
case of even-comparatives.
 There are remaining issues to determine that this analysis is a really viable 
(37) a. even* = λd*.λD′∈Dd, t.λd: D(d*)<noteworthiness D(d). D(d)
b. IP John̓ s height even* λ1 DegP -er than Bill̓ s height t1
=1 iff John̓ s height>Bill̓ s height
defined, only if d*>Bill̓ s height<noteworthiness John̓ s height>Bill̓ s
height
=d*>John̓ s height
(38) The norm-r lated presupposition will not be observed with upper-closed scal
adjectives.
(39) a. Ro A is even more bent than Rod B.
b. PSP: Rod B is bent. / Rod B is more bent than Rod C.
(40) a. Rod A is even tra ghter than Rod B.
b. PSP: #Rod B is traight. / Rod B is straighter than Rod C.
(41) a. Rod A is {??completely/??slightly} long. relative
b. Rod A is {??completely/slightly} bent. absolute, minimum-standard
c. Rod A is {completely/??slightly} straight. absolute, maximum-standard
(42) pos=λG∈Dd, et.λx.∃d. G(x)(d)∧d>stnd(G)
(43) . Rod A is bent=∃d. BENT(RodA)(d)∧d>stnd(BENT)
=∃d. BENT(RodA)(d)∧d>minimum degree of BENT
b. Rod A is straight
=∃d. STRAIGHT(R dA)(d)∧d>stnd(STRAIGHT)
=∃d. BENT(RodA)(d)∧d>maximum degree of STRAIGHT
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option for the interpretation of focus particles. If this analysis is on the right track, 
we also could predict that even-comparatives show other pronominal behaviors, such 
as modal subordination or other cross-sentential anaphoric dependency. I also would 
like to note that this analysis faces a problem, too. It is usually assumed that focus 
particles are quantificational, while this analysis does not rely on the quantification 
in the presupposition. The strong argument for the traditional quantificational 
analysis comes from a bound variable reading of her in an example like Even Mary 
is taller than her mother, where Mary is taller than her mother, Sally is taller than 
her mother, Beth is taller than her mother. Whether all these data can be dealt with in 
my analysis is left for future work.
[Notes]
1) Still has the same effect. I will not discuss this in this paper, but I believe almost the 
same analysis applies to still-comparatives. See König (1977) and Umbach (2009) for 
German noch ‘still’ in comparative sentences. 
2) Bennet (1982) mentions this use of even and argues that it should not be identified 
with other uses of the particle, as that its French counterpart même ‘even’ does not 
contribute to comparatives in the same way as even. This seems to apply to German 
sogar ‘even’ as well, according to Umbach (2009). Thus, English may be peculiar in 
this regard. 
3) It is well known that even also serves as an NPI (Karttunen and Peters 1979, among 
many others). In that case, the scalar implication is reversed: compare John read even 
Syntactic Structures (SS is difficult) vs. John didn’t read even Syntactic Structures (SS 
is easy). Even in even-comparatives also shows this scalar reversal: 
(i) If a man is not even taller than the average man, he is a fortiori not “tall”. (What? 
Where? When? Why?: Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explanation. ed. by 
Robert McLaughlin) 
4) The scale in the scalar presupposition is usually assumed to be “unlikeliness”; the 
prejacent is the least likely proposition. I adopt Kay’s (1990) analysis that the scalarity 
of even is ordered along the “noteworthiness” in information. 
5) The definition in (10a) has to be relative to possible worlds. I omit the world variable 
for the sake of simplicity here.  
6) I am not saying that the computation of the focus semantic value at other syntactic 
positions than S is not possible in the alternative semantics. Rooth (1992) assumes that 
the squiggle (~) operator, which computes the focus value of its argument, can be 
attached to any syntactic node. Even, in contrast to only, has been assumed to be a 
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sentential operator, maybe because unlike only, it can take a sentential scope in the 
auxiliary position (see Jackendoff 1972). 
7) Beck’s (2010) intention is to solve the problem of quantified expressions in than-clauses 
when combined with the max-operator. See Beck (2010) for details. 
8) It might be problematic to assume focus movement, for it is well-known that the focus 
movement is not sensitive to island-constraints (Rooth 1985, 1992). I would like to 
leave this problem for future work. 
9) “height” in the following semantic representation represents the measure function that 
maps individuals to the height scale. Umbach (2009) gives the semantics in (ia) to 
groß “tall”, but I suspect that this should be (ib) (the Kennedy-style analysis of 
gradable adjectives): 
10) Apart from the points mentioned, I doubt that the presupposition is compositionally 
obtained. 
[References]
Beck, S. 2007.  “Quantifier dependent readings of anaphoric presuppositions.” In Presupposition 
and implicature in compositional semantics. ed. by U. Sauerland and P. Stateva. 12-33. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Beck, S. 2010.  “Quantifiers in than-clauses.” Semantics and Pragmatics 3. 1-72.
Beck, S. 2016.  “Discourse related readings of scalar particles.” Proceedings of SALT 26. 142-
165. 
Bennet, J. 1982. “Even if.” Linguistics and Philosophy 5. 403-418. 
Bierwish, M. 1989. “The semantics of gradation.” Dimensional adjectives: Grammatical 
structure and conceptual interpretation. ed. by M. Bierwish and E. Lang. 71-261. 
Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer.
Heim, I. 1990. “Presupposition projection.” Presupposition, lexical meaning and discourse 
processes: Workshop reader. ed. by R. van der Sandt. 1-33. University of Nijmegen. 
Horn, L. 1969.  “A presuppositional analysis of only and even.” CLS 5. 98-107. 
Ippolito, M. 2007. “On the meaning of some focus-sensitive particles.” Linguistics and 
Philosophy 15. 1-34. 
(44) a. (39a): the bentness of Rod B>d*







(46) STRAIGHT: min̶̶̶Rod C̶̶̶Rod B̶̶̶max
(i) a. groß=λd.λx. height(x)≥d (of type d, et)
b. groß=λx. height(x)(of type e, d)
(ib) can be combined with -er, resulting in the semantics given in (iib).
(ii) a. -er=λGx, d. λy. λx. G(x)>G(y)
b. größer=λy. λx. height(x)>height(y)
(i) noch=λPe, et.λy.λx: P(d)(y). P(x)(y)
(ii) größer=λyλx. height(x)>height(y).
Since the second argument of the presupposition is of type d, not e, λyλx. height (x)
>height(y)(d)(y) should not be computed due to type mismatch.
( ) . ( ): t t f
. ( ): t tr i t f
( ) . :
i
. I :
( ) I : i
(i) . r . . i t( ) ( f t , t )
. r . i t( )( f t , )
(i ) i it - r , r lti i t ti i i (ii ).
(ii) . - r x, d. . . ( ) ( )
. r r . . i t( ) i t( )
(i) e, et. . : ( )( ). ( )( )
(ii) r r . i t( ) i t( ).
i t r t f t r iti i f t , t , . i t ( )
i t( ) ( )( ) l t t t t i t .
Focus Particles in Comparative Sentences 19
Jackendoff, R. 1972.  Semantic interpretation in generative grammar. Mass.: MIT Press. 
Karttunen, L. and S. Peters. 1979. “Conventional implicature.” Syntax and Semantics 11. 
1-56. 
Kay, P. 1990.  “Even.”  Linguistics and Philosophy 13. 59-111. 
Kennedy, C. 2007. “Vagueness and grammar: the semantics of relative and absolute 
gradable adjectives.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30. 1-45. 
König, E. 1977.  “Temporal and non-temporal uses of noch and schön in German.” 
Linguistics and Philosophy 1. 173-198.
Rooth, M. 1985. Association with focus. PhD Diss. UMass, Amherst. 
Rooth, M. 1992. “A theory of focus interpretation.” Natural Language Semantics 1. 75-116.
Umbach, C. 2009. “Comparatives combined with additive particles: The case of German 
noch.” Proccedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 13. 
von Stechow, A. 1984. “Comparing semantic theories of comparison.” Journal of Semantics 
3. 1-77. 
Zhang, L. and J. Ling. 2016. “Additive particles with a built-in Gricean pragmatics: The 
semantics of German noch, Chinese hâi and Hungarian mêg.”Proceedings of LSA. 1. 
Article 22:1-15.
[Acknowledgement]
This paper is a revised version of my paper read at the 153th Meeting of Linguistic Society 
of Japan. I would like to thank the audience, especially Takeo Kurafuji, for their invaluable 
comments and criticisms. I also would like to thank the members of Semantics Workshop in 
Tokai, including Koji Kawahara, Yusuke Kubota, Ikumi Imani, Kenta Mizutani and Osamu 
Sawada. My deepest gratitude also goes to Ron Crosby and James Crocker, who have been 





Focus Particles in Comparative Sentences
Eri Tanaka
This paper tackles the problems that are produced by what I call 
even-comparatives (e.g., John is even taller than Bill). Even-comparatives exhibit 
the peculiar behavior in that (i) they are accompanied by a presupposition that the 
compared element is norm-related when asserted out of the blue, (ii) but when 
preceded by a comparative, the norm-relatedness is absent, and (iii) in the case of 
(ii), the compared element has to be identified with the subject of the preceding 
comparative. I show that these properties cannot be derived from the traditional 
focus semantic analysis of even. I propose the introduction of a free degree variable 
as an alternative to the degree in the focused phrase in the prejacent, keeping the 
insight from the literature that even is a scalar particle that orders propositions along 
their noteworthiness. The properties in (i) and (ii) are explained by the variable 
assignment to the free degree variable, and the fixed reference problem in (iii) is 
solved in terms of the requirement of the most noteworthiness to the prejacent.
